The heuristic function of duality by De Haro, S
Synthese
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1708-9
The heuristic function of duality
Sebastian De Haro1,2
Received: 4 November 2017 / Accepted: 29 January 2018
© The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication
Abstract I conceptualise the role of dualities in quantum gravity, in terms of their
functions for theory construction. I distinguish between two functions of duality in
physical practice: namely, discovering and describing ‘equivalent physics’, versus sug-
gesting ‘new physics’. I dub these the ‘theoretical’ versus the ‘heuristic’ functions of
dualities. The distinction seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the philosophical lit-
erature: and it exists both for dualities, and for the more general relation of theoretical
equivalence. The paper develops the heuristic function of dualities: illustrating how
they can be used, if one has any luck, to find and formulate new theories. I also point to
the different physical commitments about the theories in question that underlie these
two functions. I show how a recently developed schema for dualities articulates the
differences between the two functions.
Keywords Heuristics · Duality · Methodology in quantum gravity
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 The schema for duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Theories and models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 The conception of duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 Tools for theory construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Aims of scientific theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B Sebastian De Haro
sd696@cam.ac.uk
1 Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, UK
2 Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Free School Lane, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK
123
Synthese
3.2 The theoretical function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 The heuristic function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 The two functions of duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 The distinction in string theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.1 Motivating duality: string theory and the M theory programe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2 Duality as exact equivalence: duality’s theoretical function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.3 Duality and approximation: duality as a heuristic for theory construction . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Does the distinction imply a tension? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 The heuristic function of duality and theoretical equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 How to use dualities heuristically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.1 Point particle heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.2 Quantum gravity heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Successor theories and models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.1 Theories and models: the point particle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Successor theories and the heuristic function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 Comparing the schema with other philosophical work on duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1 Isomorphism versus gauge symmetry and heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Rickles’ comments on the ‘deeper theory’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 Introduction
There is a use of duality and of theoretical equivalence that seems to have gone largely
unnoticed in most of the literature, and on which this paper aims to zoom in: it is the
distinction between what I shall call the theoretical versus the heuristic functions of
both dualities and of theoretical equivalence (Sect. 4).1 By applying the schema for
dualities from De Haro (2016) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017) to the heuristic
function of duality, the paper aims to shed light on the practical use of duality and
theoretical equivalence to construct new theories out of approximately dual models—
which is the task of the heuristic function of dualities (Sect. 5). If one is lucky, that
is: for heuristics, of course, never lead mechanically, or with deductive certainty, to
novel theories. In other words, I will regard dualities as tools, or methodologies, for
theory construction. To do so, I will place dualities against a philosophical background
discussion about the aims of scientific theories, about tools for theory construction,
and about the different functions that those tools have (Sect. 3). The discussion should
be useful for understanding different approaches to theory construction in high-energy
physics and in quantum gravity more generally.
Dualities have become standard tools for theory construction in theoretical physics:
since, at least, the discovery of position-momentum duality in quantum mechanics,
and of electric-magnetic duality. But even more so, recently, especially in quantum
gravity. In string theory in particular, dualities are seen as central tools for finding the
still unknown M theory, as well as for learning a great deal about already existing
theories.
1 The only exceptions I am aware of are: Rickles (2011, 2013, 2017), Dieks et al. (2014) and De Haro and
Butterfield (2017), in the case of duality, and Coffey (2016), in the case of theoretical equivalence. I will
discuss the Rickles’ views in Sect. 6.2, and Coffey’s in Sect. 4.2 (cf. also De Haro 2018a: §3.4.1). However,
I here anticipate that a philosophical analysis of the heuristic function of dualities does not yet exist in the
literature: and so, this paper aims to fill that gap.
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Analysing the role of dualities as tools for theory construction in quantum gravity
should help us to conceptualise some dominant practices in this field: and, in par-
ticular, it should be instrumental in explaining the importance that scientists ascribe
to dualities in the overall string theory and M theory programmes. As such, a good
conceptualisation of dualities, as elements of scientific practice, could also be instru-
mental for broader questions of theory assessment and of the progressiveness of the
quantum gravity programmes—a question which I will nevertheless not take up here.
We can see my distinction between the theoretical and the heuristic functions of
dualities or, more generally, theoretical equivalence, in a widespread difference in how
they are discussed. On the one hand, we are told (sometimes with the addition of several
exclamation marks!) that dualities imply that very different theoretical descriptions
give rise to the same physics, or equivalent physics: and so, a theory of gravity in D
dimensions is dual to a gauge theory in D −1 dimensions (which goes under the name
of ‘gauge-gravity duality’, or ‘the holographic principle’). Or a theory in a very large
volume, V , is dual to a theory in a very small volume, 1/V , in appropriate units (this
is called ‘T duality’). And so on. But, on the other hand, we are also told (sometimes
adding even more exclamation marks!), that dualities point to new physics: and so,
holographic dualities ‘point towards a new definition of string theory’, or the dualities
between the five different 10-dimensional string theories and one supergravity theory
(some of which are related by the same T duality mentioned before) ‘point to the
existence of a, so far unknown, 11-dimensional M theory’. And so on.
Although the philosophy of dualities is now thriving,2 the recent philosophical
literature has—apart from the occasional mention—failed to analyse in detail this
second aspect: i.e. physicists’ claims that dualities ‘point to new physics’. The literature
also does not seem to have noticed the different kinds of claims that physicists make
about dualities, and the kinds of expectations that are associated with such claims.
In fact, the recent philosophical analysis of dualities has almost unanimously sided
with the former interpretation of dualities: as cases of theoretical (and sometimes
also physical) equivalence. This is understandable for the still young literature on
dualities: after all, there is a venerable tradition of equivalence in the philosophy of
science, which is rooted in logic and mathematics—and philosophers are less prone to
mingle with physics that is not settled, or with theories that are still under construction.
Thus ‘heuristics’ is often left to the physicists.
The general philosophy of science literature on theoretical equivalence, on the other
hand, has noticed—and discussed in some depth—a similar distinction. But it is only
similar, and not the same; because in the general context of theoretical equivalence, the
issues that have been discussed so far are slightly different. Coffey (2016: Sects. 3.1–
3.2) has noticed an ‘asymmetric treatment’ of theoretically equivalent cases, which
is similar to the distinction I am drawing here. But his treatment differs widely from
mine, as I will discuss in Sect. 4.2.
2 See, for example, a recent special issue edited by Castellani and Rickles (2017), in Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics. For some recent philosophical discussions of dualities in string theory,
see e.g. De Haro et al. (2015), De Haro (2016), Dieks et al. (2014), Fraser (2017), Huggett (2017), Read
(2016), Rickles (2011, 2013, 2017) and Matsubara (2013).
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Thus, by siding with the ‘equivalence’ account of duality and its corresponding
use, which—I will agree—is indeed the correct account if one wishes to explicate
the nature of duality,3 the philosophical literature has left unanalysed (and I will
substantiate this claim in Sect. 6.2) the main use that physicists make of dualities:
namely the construction of new theories, as in for example the influential M theory
programme.
Thus: the distinction between the theoretical and the heuristic functions is this:
on the one hand, dualities describe equivalent theories (i.e. they make new connex-
ions between the physics described by different-looking, but given, theories, e.g. by
describing the common core that is shared between two theories). They assume we
have almost complete control over those theories, so that duality conjectures can be
used to develop a theory that describes the common core. And on the other, dualities
are used to develop new theories, which apparently go beyond that common core,
which is supposed to be the theory.4
One might think that there is an apparent tension here: if duality only expresses the
equivalence between already existing theories, then it is not entirely clear how duality
can help develop a theory that supersedes the two existing theories, or develop a
candidate theory that will succeed them—thereby invalidating the preceding theories,
and their duality relation. But I will argue that the tension is indeed only apparent:
it corresponds to two different functions of duality in scientific practice. Namely,
duality-as-theoretical-equivalence assumes that the two theories are well-defined, and
requires that their theoretical descriptions be exactly equivalent; while the accounts
that we are given, for how new physics arises from dualities, invariably assume that
both the duality and the theories involved are not exact, and in fact cannot be rendered
exact in the context of the theory yet to be developed, which only instantiates duality
approximately. In fact, the physics literature sometimes moves seamlessly back and
forth between these two views of duality: and only confusion can ensue from the
mixing of these two functions.
In this paper, I will use the Schema for duality from De Haro (2016) and De Haro
and Butterfield (2017) to clarify the distinction between these two different functions
and to develop in detail the heuristic function. As such, the paper can be seen as an
application of that Schema, thus further supporting the Schema’s applicability.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, I give the details about the Schema
for duality, from De Haro (2016) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017), that I will use
in the rest of the paper. In Sect. 3, I give some background about the idea of tools for
theory construction, and define the two functions of these tools that I will consider.
In Sect. 4, I expound the basic distinction between the two functions of duality. In
Sect. 5, I expound the heuristic function of dualities. In Sect. 6, I compare the Schema
to other recent philosophical work on dualities. Section 7 concludes.
3 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical function of duality and theoretical equivalence, see De Haro
(2018b).
4 For an explication of dualities, see De Haro (2016, 2018b) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017).
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2 The schema for duality
In this Section, I summarise the Schema for duality, from De Haro (2016) and De Haro
and Butterfield (2017), which we will use in later Sections. In Sect. 2.1, I introduce
theories and models, and in Sect. 2.2 I give the Schema’s conception of duality.
2.1 Theories and models
The core notion of the Schema is that of a bare theory: an uninterpreted, abstract
mathematical structure with a set of rules for forming propositions, i.e. an abstract
calculus. A bare theory could consist of a set of axioms or a set of equations. But, to be
specific, the Schema considers a bare theory as a triple, T := 〈S,Q,D〉, of a structured
state space, S, a structured set of quantities, Q, and a dynamics, D, consistent with
the relevant structure. ‘Structure’ here refers: first, to symmetries which may act on
the states and-or the quantities, e.g. as automorphisms of the state space, a : S → S.
And second, ‘structure’ also refers to the set of rules for inferring propositions, i.e. for
assigning values to the quantities (e.g. as a map Q × S → R).
This conception of theory is as yet:
(i) uninterpreted, i.e. there are no rules for interpreting elements of the theory as
quantities ‘in the world’,
(ii) abstract, i.e. there are rules for forming propositions that assign various values
to elements of the triple, but there are no (there need not be) rules for practical
computation. The latter typically require further definitions.
Nevertheless, this conception is physical: for choosing a set of states, quantities, and
a dynamics as one’s theory, even if still uninterpreted, is a physical choice which
constraints the descriptive capacities of the theory (in particular, it constrains the
“number of physical degrees of freedom” of the theory).
The task of (i), i.e. interpretation, is done by the interpretation map(s), as follows.
An interpretation is a set of partial maps, preserving appropriate structure, from the
theory to the world. The interpretation fixes the reference of the terms in the theory.
More precisely, an intepretation maps the theory, T , to a domain of application, DW ,
within a possible world, W , i.e. it maps I : T → DW . Using different interpretation
maps, the same theory can describe different domains of the world, and even different
possible worlds. For more details, also about the kinds of maps required, see De Haro
(2018b: §1.1.2).
The task of (ii), i.e. of providing structure for computation, is done by the theory’s
models:
A model M of a bare theory T is a realization, or mathematical instantiation: i.e. it is
a mathematical entity having the same structure as the theory, and usually some specific
structure of its own. We will use a more specific notion of model, as a representation
of the theory, i.e. a homomorphism from the theory to some other known structure:
but not a merely mathematical representation, for we will make the following physical
distinction within the homomorphism. A model of a physical theory naturally suggests
the notion of, on the one hand, the model root: the realization of the theory, usually its
homomorphic copy; on the other, the specific structure: that structure which goes into
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building the model root, and is not part of the theory’s structure (i.e. not part of what
the theory regards as physical), and which gives the model its specificity. Part of this
structure is normally used for calculations within the model—but calculations can of
course be done in different ways, using different specific structure.
It is helpful to have a schematic notation for models that exhibits how to augment
the structure of a theory with specific structure:
M = 〈m, M¯〉 . (2.1)
Here, m is the model root, and M¯ is the specific structure which goes into building m. In
cases where T is a triple, m must itself be a triple with properties that are homomorphic
to those of T . We call it the model triple. Thus the model M , Eq. (2.1), is a quadruple:
with the triple m containing the states, quantities, and dynamics, and M¯ the specific
structure that goes into constructing the model triple. Like bare theories, models (and
model triples) are, at this stage, uninterpreted (and an interpretation can again be
added as a set of partial maps). Thus, the distinction between dealing with a purely
mathematical representation of a theory, and dealing with a physical representation, is
in the fact that the model makes a distinction between what is physical, by the lights of
the model (the homomorphic copy of the theory) and the specific structure (anything
else that the model may contain: such as an auxiliary calculus).
This usage of ‘model’ diverges from the normal usage of a model as a particular
solution of a theory (or a particular trajectory in the space of states). What we here
call a ‘model’ is often called a ‘theory’. This usage is motivated by dualities: dualities
relate different ‘theories’, as being different formulations of ‘one underlying theory’:
and so, they suggest that we should push the usage of both ‘theory’ and ‘model’ “one
level up”, while maintaining their mutual relation. In view of this basic fact about
dualities—what were seemingly different theories are now just one theory—we are
led to allow a more general notion of theory, and of model.
2.2 The conception of duality
Having given conceptions of theories and of models, we give, in this Section, the
conception of duality:
A duality is now defined as an isomorphism between model roots of a single bare
theory, where the model roots are taken to be representations of the theory. Theories
may have many representations: representations that are isomorphic to the original
theory and representations that are not isomorphic to the original theory. But if we
have two (or more) representations that are isomorphic to each other (whether they
are isomorphic to the original theory or not), we have a duality.
More specifically, under the conception of a bare theory as a triple from Sect. 2.1, a
duality is an isomorphism of model roots, mi , which are model triples. That is, given
a set of models, Mi = 〈mi , M¯i 〉i∈I (where I is an index set that labels the different
models), notice that each model root can be written as a triple, i.e. mi = 〈Si ,Qi ,Di 〉.
Here, Si is the set of states for the model Mi , Qi its set of quantities, and Di its
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dynamics. Duality between two such models, mi ∼= m j for some i, j ∈ I , now comes
down to a triple of isomorphisms, one for each of the three items in the triple.5
3 Tools for theory construction
This paper develops the heuristic function of dualities in constructing new theories
of quantum gravity. Our topic is thus theory construction, and in Sect. 4 I will argue
that duality is one of the tools, or methodologies, which are available for theory con-
struction.6 Therefore, we should have a basic sense of how tools are used in scientific
theories, and of how they contribute to the aims of scientific theories. In Sect. 3.1, I
discuss different aims of science. In Sects. 3.2 and 3.3, I discuss the theoretical and
the heuristic functions of the tools, respectively.
There are two things that my discussion in this Section will not attempt to do:
(i) to give a complete list of tools (whatever that would be), (ii) to give analytic
definitions of the different tools. As noted in De Haro and De Regt (2017) for tools for
scientific understanding (and it seems to be the same in this case): such an aim would
be illusory. Thus my aim will be much more modest: I will view tools as ‘just tools
towards achieving a goal, and not as necessary or as sufficient conditions for achieving
a goal’.7 On this practical approach, one admits that goals can be achieved by many
different means: and that classifications of tools, even if useful, will therefore always
remain incomplete. And one also admits that tools can be used in different ways, and
that different tools can be used to fulfill the same function: therefore, for most functions
we wish a tool to fulfill, there will always be an element of specificity, ad-hocness, or
even vagueness.8
That said, there are, of course, substantive philosophical questions about how tools
are used, and about how they achieve their aims.
Theory construction versus the context of discovery My talk here of ‘theory con-
struction’ is not meant to imply my endorsing a sharp philosophical distinction between
what has traditionally been called the ‘context of discovery’ versus the ‘context of
justification’: about which one can indeed have justified reservations [see e.g. Rad-
5 In most cases, choosing a dynamics is singling out a quantity, in the setQ, as the Lagrangian of Hamiltonian
“driving” the dynamics. In this case, the third isomorphism condition is not an independent map, but it is
a meshing condition between the choices of dynamics, for the two dual models, and the duality map: i.e. it
is an equivariance condition between the two duality maps and the dynamics. See De Haro and Butterfield
(2017: §3.2.1) for more details.
6 The word ‘tool’ is standardly used in the literature on scientific understanding on which I build (De Haro
and De Regt (2017) and references therein), and so I will stick to its use.
7 See e.g. Laudan (1984: p. 44): ‘cognitive values [which elsewhere, on p. xii, he also calls ‘aims’] under-
determine methodological rules’ (which I call ‘tools’). Though my terminology differs from Laudan’s, I
agree that there is no ‘covariance’ between the methods and the aims of a theory. In this sense, I also agree
with the general gist of his ‘reticulated model’ (pp. 62–63): viz. that theories, methods, and aims are not
related linearly or strictly hierarchically, but are intertwined in relations of mutual dependency.
8 In the philosophy of science, Laudan speaks about underdetermination of methodological rules [tools]
by aims (1984: p. 44). This, however is still very general. I will be primarily concerned with the function
which a tool can fulfill. In the philosophy of technology, multiple function ascription is regarded as a virtue
that it is good for a theory to have. See Houkes and Vermaas (2010: p. 59).
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der (1991: pp. 222–223)]. Rather, there is, of course, a scientific activity of theory
construction—which is what the current programme of quantum gravity is largely
involved in. As such, theory construction entails both the discovery and the develop-
ment of new theories, as well as their justification and assessment. In this paper, I aspire
to give an anatomy of the use of dualities, within the broader picture of philosophers’
thinking about heuristics.
3.1 Aims of scientific theories
In this Section, I discuss some of the aims of theoretical enquiry, i.e. the aims of sci-
entific theories, and how these can sometimes lead to tensions between the different
functions of the elements comprising a theory (viz. bare theory, interpretation, mod-
els).9 I will argue that some of these tensions are substantive; although they do not
necessarily lead to contradictions and they can be resolved, depending on a variety of
factors. The aim here is to provide the background against which, in Sect. 4, I will
state the distinction between the two functions of duality.
A theory can be used to describe the world in detail and accurately, on a suitable
interpretation. Other uses of theories are instrumental: for example, using the theory
as a calculational tool to get “quick and dirty” results about a situation of interest,
without paying attention to other contextual details that are irrelevant for, say, the aim
of quantitative prediction in a specific situation—though prediction need, of course, not
always be instrumental. These two uses—the descriptive and the instrumental—are of
course tuned to corresponding aims of theories: and so there is no real incompatibility
here. Debate can then ensue about how to prioritize those goals, about how the goals
are related, or about the conditions under which a given goal is worth pursuing, but
not about whether a theory can in fact have those two different uses: for they are both
legitimate.10
Furthermore, a theory, and especially its interpretation, can also be aimed at expla-
nation or at understanding [Toulmin (1961: §2), De Haro and De Regt (2018a: §1.1),
De Regt (2017)]. For example, Ruetsche (2011: pp. 3–4) has contrasted an ‘ideal of
pristine interpretation’, which sees the business of interpretation as a ‘lofty’ affair that
is only concerned with the general question of which worlds are possible according
to the theory, and not with the application of the theory to actual systems. She argues
for ‘a less principled and more pragmatic approach to interpreting physical theories,
one which allows ‘geographical’ considerations to influence theoretical content, and
also allows the same theory to receive different interpretations in different contexts.’
(p. 4).
A similar difference is sometimes seen between differing uses of the word ‘model’:
while the philosophy of physics literature tends to endorse the semantic conception of
models, i.e. as the set of worlds that are possible according to the theory, in the general
9 For more details on my use of these notions, see De Haro (2016) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017).
10 That scientific theories can have ‘several different, even mutually incompatible, goals’ (Laudan 1984: p.
63), should be uncontroversial. ‘There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate
to engage in inquiry for a wide variety of reasons and with a wide variety of purposes” (Laudan 1984: pp. 63–
64). See also Toulmin (1961: §2).
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philosophy of science the notion of models involves both context and approximation—
there, models mediate between the theory and concrete phenomena, which obtain
under definite circumstances.11
One must of course recognise that behind these disagreements in the literature,
about what interpretations and models ‘really are’, there can be—and there often
are—larger philosophical differences: between theoretical and practical approaches
to science, between realist and anti-realist positions, or between trust in the notion of
laws of nature versus belief in a ‘dappled world’—just to mention some.
But one must also admit that, these larger differences aside, there is a clear way to
go about resolving the disagreements about the philosophical notions of interpretation
and model, i.e. about the notions which comprise a theory: namely, by recognising that
they are tuned to diverse, but equally legitimate, aims for which the notions involved
(viz. bare theory, interpretation, model: cf. Sect. 2.1) are used. Thus for example,
the question of whether a model is a possible world in which the theory is true, or
is a contextual and specific application of a theory to describe a phenomenon, will
receive different answers depending, to a large extent, on the kind of question one is
asking. Indeed, it will depend on the specific purpose one wishes the word ‘model’
to fulfill—that of, say, expounding the descriptive capacities of a theory versus that
of expounding its applicability to specific cases. Again, the two uses are legitimate,
though they will no doubt lead to different philosophical accounts.
Like theories, dualities and relations of theoretical equivalence can also have several
aims: not only in the construction of new theories, but they can also have instrumental
uses, and they can be used to explain or to attain understanding [De Haro and De Regt
(2017 §2,3.1)].
Here, I will concentrate on theory construction. But even within the general aim of
theory construction: a duality, or a relation of theoretical equivalence, can have differ-
ent functions. That is, there are different ways in which a theory can be constructed,
using dualities or equivalences. My point (in the next two Sections) will be that the
two functions—theoretical and heuristic—should not be confused, because they lead
to different results. Indeed, there are two functions of dualities which:
(i) Are both expressed in the physics literature.
(ii) Express actual scientific disagreements about what the unifying theory underly-
ing a duality relation looks like (e.g. M theory).
(iii) Do in fact correspond to different aims, and different uses, of the notion of duality,
and lead to different results.
(iv) Nevertheless, do not lead to contradictions; i.e. they exemplify different ways in
which theory construction can be approached.
11 My use of ‘model’ in Sect. 2.1 differs from both of these uses. Although my use of ‘model’ in an
essentially model-theoretic sense, what I here call ‘model’ is often called a ‘theory’, as I mentioned in
Sect. 2.1. So I will call the other construal of a model, as a description of a concrete system that mediates
between theory and phenomena, a ‘model description’ (of a system, or of a phenomenon).
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3.2 The theoretical function
In this Section, I briefly introduce the theoretical function, that tools for theory con-
struction can have.
There are of course many kinds of theoretical tools used in physics: for example
symmetry arguments, analogies, approximative relations, and indeed dualities. These
tools can take on different functions, i.e. they can be put to use in different ways,
under different constraints, and for different purposes (even if the general aim, as we
assumed throughout this Section, is invariably taken to be ‘theory construction’).12
The theoretical function I have in mind is aimed at developing a given theory, i.e. not
a novel theory, according to constraints. It is the aim of extracting the content of a
theory “that is somehow already there”, even if only implicitly, using a set of rules.
The set of rules is then the tool in question, though use of the tool of course never by
itself guarantees success.
For example, once one knows the Hamiltonian (i.e. the energy function) describing
a system in classical mechanics, one can use Hamilton’s variational principle to derive
the equations of motion for that system. In doing so, one may encounter problems
(e.g. the difficulty of how to choose appropriate boundary conditions for a given
situation), so success is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, the equations of motion are, in
essence, “already there” once the Hamiltonian is given, since there is a set of steps
which lead from a Hamiltonian to the equations of motion, partly deductively. That
set of steps, i.e. Hamilton’s variational principle, is the tool in question, used in its
theoretical function of finding the equations of motion, i.e. of extracting the full theory
(of which the equations of motion constitute the dynamics).
The theoretical function, as just presented, comes with a partly deductive procedure
to get the theory, T : and so, the theory is, in a way, already there from the start.13 Thus
the method is not aimed at finding physical novelty: even if in some cases it may find
some novelty—precisely in those cases in which complete deduction fails. Rather, it is
aimed at making more perspicuous the conceptual and-or mathematical presentation
of the theory T . This is what I call the theoretical function of a tool.
One might object: why call duality a ‘tool’, and the use made of this tool a ‘function’?
Is it not simply a case of providing a mathematical proof of duality, i.e. is duality not
the thing we wish to prove, rather than the tool to achieve a goal?
The answer is No, and for tree reasons. First: a proof of duality, given a set of
models, only requires the existence of a theory, of which the models in question are
representations, and of an isomorphism between the models: the proof does not require
the actual construction of the theory, T , which is the aim of the theoretical function
12 There is a lively debate, in the philosophy of technology, about the correct notion of ‘function’ (see
Houkes and Vermaas 2010: Chapter 3). I will not need to develop a function theory, although I believe that
the analogy between artefacts and scientific theories can be used to specify more precisely what one means
by a ‘function’ of a scientific theory.
13 A theory, T , thus formulated may of course have unforeseen consequences, such as the existence of new
(non-isomorphic models). Elucidating the physical interpretation of those new models will be the task of
the heuristic function. Notice that the theoretical function of course has an element of heuristics of its own
(cf. the remark above about boundary conditions): but the method of the theoretical function is a largely
deductive—sometimes even a mechanical—one, i.e. it follows prescribed rules.
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(cf. the definition of duality in Sect. 2.2, does not explicitly mention the theory, but
only its models). Thus the aim of constructing a theory, T , is more ambitious than the
aim of proving duality.
Second, the theory thus constructed need not be unique, as emphasised in De Haro
and Butterfield (2017: §2.4). Thus, there is judgment involved in deciding which
theory, T , is the most appropriate one, in a specific situation.
Third, there is also choice that scientists can make between attempting to try to
construct the common core, i.e. the theory T , or not constructing it. For the construction
of theories exhibiting a duality is not a necessary aim of scientific theories: a theory
with a duality need not necessarily be better than a theory without it. In other words,
theorists faced with a duality are free to construct the theory T or to not construct
it, and there can even be a choice of the theory T among a number of competitors.
Thus, duality is a tool towards theory construction which scientists can choose to try
to construct such a theory, as a common core, if they so wish: and the function duality
then has is a theoretical one.
An analogy with symmetries and with approximative relations is helpful here.
Imagine a rule that produces, given an input state, an output set of states, according
to a symmetry principle (e.g. given a wave-function with given energy, symmetry
considerations are used to produce other wave-functions with the same energy). This
is done by the theoretical function.
But now imagine a more adventurous use of symmetry in which, given an equation
of motion that does not display a given symmetry (e.g. because it is written in a specific
gauge or coordinate system), one writes the equation in a manifestly symmetric way
(e.g. in a gauge-invariant way, or as a covariant equation). Once again, one can here
give rules for such a procedure, of symmetrisation, or covariantization. This use of
symmetry also falls under the theoretical function, for two reasons:
(i) there is a well-defined general rule, saying ‘for any equation A of a certain kind that
does not exhibit a symmetry, there is an equation B that is manifestly symmetric’,
(ii) it does so in such a way that the number of degrees of freedom is not modified, in
particular it is required that no new physical degrees of freedom are introduced.
Thus, though not strictly deductive in the logical sense, this use of the theoretical
function still operates according to a general rule, and it does not introduce “new
physics”.
Similarly for an approximative scheme: this theoretical ‘function’ is a matter of
a reduction, or linkage, between two theories.14 Given a basic, or ‘bottom’, theory
Tb, the approximation scheme is a rule that produces a new, ‘top’, theory Tt. Again,
though the success of the application of this rule is not guaranteed: if it succeeds, then
one ends up with a theory Tt that is obtained from Tb. Because there is reduction, or
at least linkage, there is a sense in which the degrees of freedom of Tt can be taken to
be derived from those of Tb (under suitable assumptions about the approximation).15
14 Philosophers’ traditional account of reduction is that of Nagel (1961: pp. 351–363). For the notion of
approximation which I use, see De Haro (2018a).
15 I am assuming that there is no novelty in the interpretation of the top theory, relative to the basic
theory (for an account of ontological and epistemic novelty and the associated notions of emergence, see
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3.3 The heuristic function
In this Section, I briefly introduce the heuristic function that tools for theory construc-
tion can have.
Whewell (1876: p. 480) described ‘heuristic’ as the ‘art of discovery’, which, he
admitted, was not to be understood as ‘a kind of Logic’. A narrower conception of
heuristics is as a set of ‘efficient rules or procedures for converting complex problems
into simpler ones’ (Hey 2016: p. 472). It is the former conception which I have in
mind in this paper: a tool as used in the art of discovery, and in the construction of
new theories.16 It is a tool, rather than a rule, because success in theory construction
is never guaranteed; nor can the tool be applied mechanically, as the phrase ‘efficient
rule’ would suggest.
Indeed, whenever general, and more or less mechanical, rules are involved in theory
construction, I will take the corresponding use of the tool to belong to the theoretical
function, as discussed in Sect. 3.2, rather than to the heuristic function (assuming that
the rules also do not introduce new degrees of freedom or interpretative novelty). The
heuristic use of a tool involves craftmanship and creativity, and should lead to the
formulation of new theories, which contain new physics: rather than merely refor-
mulating more precisely, or more perspicuously, already (implicitly) known theories,
according to systematic rules.
The heuristic function will obviously have some rules of its own (having to do
with the sorts of constraints that the new theories should satisfy), but the defining
mark lies in the theoretical and physical novelties that are its aims. Novelty in the the-
ory’s formalism includes: the number and nature of states and quantities (or ‘physical
degrees of freedom’), the dynamics, and the rules for calculating physical quantities
(cf. Sect. 2.1). Novelty in the interpretation is novelty in the theory’s reference to
worldly items, which includes cases of ontological emergence.
Let me illustrate this in the examples given in the previous Section. There, we
considered a system for which the Hamiltonian was given. The theoretical function
then was a rule that gave us the equations of motion for this system. Now consider a
system for which the Hamiltonian needs to be found. The main difference between the
two cases is that, in the former, there is a partly deductive procedure. In the second case,
there is no such procedure, and the arguments required are of a different kind. Scientists
indeed use heuristics when, given a physical system, they try to find a Hamiltonian
describing this system. The procedure in question may involve the writing down of
parts of a Hamiltonian (or limits of it) which they already know from similar systems:
Footnote15 continued
De Haro 2018a). For I take a procedure that helps develop a new interpretation of a theory to be part
of a heuristic function as well. The example of approximation here is what Radder (1991) has called
‘correspondence from L [Tb] to S [Tt]. It is the kind of heuristics considered by Post, Krajewski, and Fadner
(mentioned in Radder 1991). With Radder, and contra these authors, I do not take heuristics to be applicable
only, or even mainly, at the formal level.
16 The heuristic function is of course not limited to the construction of new theories. It in fact plays
an important role as well in the application of known theories, in theory confirmation, etc. However, as
mentioned before, I will here restrict the discussion to theory construction, which is relevant to Sect. 5 main
example, the quantum gravity programme.
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but it also involves educated guesses about those parts of the Hamiltonian which they
do not yet know, e.g. because they describe some of the system’s novel, or even unique,
features. Such tentative guesses are usually informed by different kinds of arguments:
symmetry arguments, combined with arguments about the number and kind of degrees
of freedom to be described, assumptions or constraints about the admissible kinds of
interactions, etc. But even if physicists are able to come up with fairly systematic rules
constraining the admissible classes of Hamiltonians (though this usually only works
for a class of similar problems), in the end there is no mechanical, or indeed general,
rule for writing down the Hamiltonian describing a physical system: it is ultimately
always a matter of creativity, craftmanship, and some luck, and the best one can do is
verify that it describes the target system accurately, in specific situations.
Recall the example, at the end of Sect. 3.2, of an approximative scheme (e.g. h¯
small compared to the action) relating the top theory, Tt, to the bottom theory, Tb. The
heuristic relationship between Tb and Tt now goes in the opposite direction to that
discussed in Sect. 3.2. Given an approximative theory, Tt, and given an approximation
scheme from which one believes Tt (or a theory close to it) is obtained, physicists’ job
is now to try and guess, or to somehow reconstruct, the basic theory, Tb. Again, such
educated guesses are subject to constraints, but Tb can ultimately only be justified if
it describes more phenomena than Tt does.17
4 The two functions of duality
In the previous Section, I discussed two of the functions that tools for theory construc-
tion can have: a theoretical function and a heuristic function. In this Section, I will
discuss those two functions for dualities in string theory, and show how they differ. In
Sect. 4.1, I expound the basic distinction, using quotations from the physics literature.
In Sect. 4.2, I argue that there is only an apparent tension: not an incompatibility.
4.1 The distinction in string theory
In this subsection, I describe how the distinction between the theoretical and the heuris-
tic functions plays out in string theory. To this end, I use quotes from the physics
literature (since, as I mentioned, the philosophical literature on dualities has not iden-
tified this tension).
After introducing, in Sect. 4.1.1, the string and M theory programmes, I proceed
in two steps. In Sect. 4.1.2, I describe the theoretical function of duality. This is
the function which the philosophical literature has focused on. I have discussed this
theoretical function in detail in De Haro (2018b), to which I refer for details. Then, in
Sect. 4.1.3, I argue that there is a second, heuristic, function, which duality plays: that
17 There is of course no claim here that Tb is descriptively strictly better than Tt, in each and every respect.
Kuhn losses may well be our fate! But at least Tb does explain the success of Tt. This possibility of a ‘loss’,
when going from Tt to Tb, is of course the counterpart of emergence, in the reverse direction. See De Haro
(2018a).
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second function is certainly no less important than the theoretical function, and so it
deserves philosophical scrutiny.
4.1.1 Motivating duality: string theory and the M theory programe
I first briefly introduce, in this Section, the main ideas behind the string theory and M
theory programme: and, in particular, the role of duality within that programme.
String theory is a candidate theory for the unification of general relativity and quan-
tum field theory. Its basic assumption is that matter is made of strings, i.e. extended,
one-dimensional objects that can vibrate, move around in spacetime, and interact by
joining or by splitting.
For string theory to be mathematically consistent, 10 spacetime dimensions are
required for the strings to move in (6 of which are thought to be curled up, so that they
are inaccessible to current experiments). In the low-energy limit, string theory is well-
approximated by supergravity theories, i.e. supersymmetric extensions of Einstein’s
theory of general relativity, which are also 10-dimensional, and compactified down to
four dimensions.
Initially, five different string theories were known, differing over the precise details
defining the strings. However, significant dualities were found relating them to one
another. T duality, for example, relates one type of string theory on a circle of radius
R, to another type of string theory on a circle of radius 1/R. And electric-magnetic
duality (so-called S duality) relates some other string theories.
In 1995, Witten conjectured that the five known string theories, plus in addition a
sixth known, 11-dimensional, supergravity theory, were all different limits of (approxi-
mations to) a single 11-dimensional theory, which he dubbed M theory. Witten assumed
the eleventh dimension to be a circle, which could be of one of two kinds. He identi-
fied the radius of this circle with the coupling constant ruling the joining and splitting
interactions of the strings. For a small circle of the first kind, the string coupling is
weak, so that one of the five known 10-dimensional string descriptions describing
weakly-coupled strings (the so-called perturbative string theory), is accurate. For a
small circle of the second kind, another of the five known versions of perturbative
string theory is accurate. The other three string theories are related to these two by T
and S dualities.
But, at strong coupling, the eleventh dimension opens up, and the perturbative
string descriptions are no longer valid. Eleven-dimensional supergravity provides a
semi-classical description in 11 dimensions, valid at strong string coupling but only
as long as the length of the fundamental string is small, i.e. in the point-particle limit
of the string (or whatever replaces it in eleven dimensions). The challenge is then to
find a theory valid away from the point-particle limit: this should be the sought-for M
theory.
Since Witten’s conjecture, two main approaches to M theory have been taken. The
first is the conjecture by Banks et al. (1997) that M theory is a theory of matrices, with
eleven-dimensional supergravity as its low-energy limit.
The second main approach is AdS/CFT, which is a series of conjectured dualities
between string theory or M theory in asymptotically anti-de Sitter space (AdS, i.e. a
manifold of negative curvature), and a specific quantum field theory at the boundary of
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this space (where CFT stands for ‘conformal field theory’). Compactifying M theory
on e.g. an internal seven-dimensional manifold of positive curvature, the remaining
four dimensions have negative curvature (“they are AdS”), and are dual to a three-
dimensional CFT, for which exact treatments exist. This approach is more generally
called ‘gauge-gravity duality’, because it relates a theory of gravity to a quantum field
theory with gauge symmetry.
Details aside, M theory is the main unifying conjecture behind the various versions
of string theory, and dualities play a key role in the attempt to formulate M theory.
What remains unclear is the precise status that dualities are supposed to have in M
theory, once a non-perturbative version for it is found. Should M theory exhibit duality,
or should dualities be superseded by the final theory—are they merely “ways towards
the formulation of a new theory”?
This question is, of course, not about trying to peek into the future of theories that
do not yet exist, but about the heuristic paths of investigation that one may reasonably
take dualities to suggest. We will explore the role of dualities within this programme
in Sects. 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Here I anticipate by saying that the answer to this question
will come down to a different function of duality.
The conjectural status of most dualities in string theory, and of M theory itself,
should not be a reason to dismiss the programme as philosophically irrelevant, or as
mere speculation. There are four reasons for this, which I here list:
First, the programme is very influential in physics: and, in the last thirty years or
so, it has spawned a large number of new ideas and technical developments which
(arguably) no other research programme in high-energy physics has been able to pro-
duce. Second, and more importantly, being conjectural does not mean being physically
and mathematically unmotivated. For the evidence that is available for some of the
string theory dualities is strong and compelling. Third, there are also rigorous results,
at various levels of mathematical and physical rigour: especially about the conformal
field theories, random matrix models, and quantum field theories involved, fairly rig-
orous mathematical results exist. Finally, it is of course simply false that philosophy
should limit itself to studying theories that are already in final form and that are math-
ematically completely rigorous: for not only would philosophers then quickly run out
of a job, but also because it is their task to clarify and assess whatever fragments of
theory are available (cf. Huggett and Wüthrich 2013: p. 284). This is especially true in
areas of research such as quantum gravity, where direct observations are so far absent,
and so the main guidance is the—apparently very strong—requirement that general
relativity and quantum field theory should be reproduced in suitable approximations,
and in addition one has the requirement of mathematical consistency and the tools
of conceptual analysis at one’s disposal (besides what little available evidence there
is from experiments and analogue experiments). Rather than making the quantum
gravity attempts uninteresting for philosophers, these four reasons make philosophy
relevant, even indispensable, to the programme of quantum gravity.
4.1.2 Duality as exact equivalence: duality’s theoretical function
In this Section, I discuss within string theory the theoretical function of duality, in the
sense of Sect. 3.2, where duality is construed as in the Schema from Sect. 2.
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The physics literature construes duality as an isomorphism between models. This
isomorphism relates the common core that the two models deem physical (i.e. the
triple of states, quantities, and dynamics). As such, duality is a formal notion, i.e. a
definite relationship between uninterpreted, but physical, models: it is a special case of
theoretical equivalence. It relates triples of states, quantities, and dynamics on the two
sides, preserving the structure of the models (including the values of the quantities,
evaluated on the states). Thus duality is not merely a formal relation, because it deals
with physical models, but by itself it makes no reference to interpretation—the latter
is the question of what I will call ‘physical equivalence’.
Both physicists and philosophers tend to construe duality this way. Therefore, the
theoretical function of dualities, i.e. the function that follows from the nature of duality,
as outlined in Sect. 3.2, is to establish theoretical relationships (more specifically: to
establish a theoretical equivalence, as a specific kind of isomorphism) between models.
These relationships typically entail relating states and quantities in one model, to states
and quantities in another model, and also relating the dynamics of one model to the
different, but isomorphic, dynamics of the other.
Thus dualities are very strong relationships between two models, since they relate
everything that the models deem physical [namely, the model root m that is within the
model M in Eq. (2.1)]. Establishing a duality between two models thus presupposes
precise knowledge of the elements of the two models (the sets of all the states and
quantities, and the complete dynamics), as well as knowledge of the relations in which
these elements stand (i.e. there are not only bijections between each of the elements
of the triples of the two models, but all physical structure must also be preserved).
Thus establishing a duality requires a formulation of a model that captures all of
those details, even if perhaps only implicitly. Full transparency of the model, or full
understanding of it or perfect computational power, are of course not (and cannot be)
required: but duality does require a formulation of the models that is as detailed as just
described, within their domains of application. I will say that such a model (i.e. one
where all the states and quantities, and the complete dynamics, as well as the complete
rules for calculations, are known and are consistent, within the domain of application
of the model) is exact.
Notice that this notion of being mathematically well-defined, within a domain of
application, is much weaker than the requirement that a model gives a non-vague,
good, or succesful description of the domain—the former is a formal requirement,
while the latter is interpretative.
Furthermore, when such models are given, and a duality between them exists, we
say the duality is exact.18
Exactness can be proven for a number of significant dualities in physics. Simple
examples are the Fourier transformation in elementary quantum mechanics, harmonic
oscillator duality, and electric-magnetic duality in electrodynamics. For more sophis-
18 Exactness is a prerequisite of duality, because it is part of the isomorphism condition. My use of the
phrase ‘exact duality’ simply emphasises duality’s exactness. It does not suggest that ‘inexact dualities’
exist, which would be contradictory. Rather, dualities can be inexact, or approximate, in a different sense:
namely, in the sense that they are not instantiated by the models in an exact manner. Whenever I use the
adjective ‘inexact’ in connexion with dualities, it will be in this sense.
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ticated dualities in quantum field theory and in quantum gravity, the only case, so far
as I know, in which the philosophical literature has proven a duality to be exact is
the example of boson-fermion duality in two dimensions (De Haro and Butterfield
2017), though in the physics literature there are other cases. Most dualities in string
theory (T duality, gauge-gravity duality, S duality, etc.) are cases of dualities which
are conjectural. Nevertheless, it is an important aspect of duality that all dualities are
exact—as they must be, according to the above definition.
The physics literature confirms the claim that dualities must be exact: i.e. that
the definition of duality entails that they are cases of exact, and not approximate,
equivalence, within a domain of application. Also, the physics literature confirms
that duality is a case of theoretical equivalence, i.e. of a formal, or mathematical,
relationship between two physical models, as in Sect. 2.2. I will now substantiate
this consensus some quotations from the physics literature, which also illustrate how
physicists think about dualities.
The literature quoted below of course also emphasises the following aspects: seem-
ingly different physics and difference of description, but equivalence (or sameness) of
theory; and the exactness of the duality, and of the theories involved, is also denoted
as the theory’s being ‘non-perturbative’, i.e. its formulation goes beyond, or does not
require, perturbation theory.
(A) In the Glossary of his textbook on string theory, Polchinski (1998, p. 367, my
emphasis) defines duality as: ‘the equivalence of seemingly distinct physical systems.
Such an equivalence often arises when a single quantum theory has distinct classical
limits.’
He describes one specific duality (T duality) as a case of sameness of theory, but
difference of description: ‘T-duality is just a different description of the same theory’
(p. 268). ‘[T-]duality is a symmetry not only of string perturbation theory but of the
exact theory (p. 248, my emphasis).
(B) In an influential paper putting forward the matrix model conjecture for the defini-
tion of M theory (mentioned in Sect. 4.1.1), Banks et al. (1997: Abstract, my emphasis)
also regard duality as an exact equivalence. Thus they write: ‘We suggest and motivate
a precise equivalence between uncompactified eleven dimensional M-theory and the
N = ∞ limit of the supersymmetric matrix quantum mechanics’. ‘If our conjecture
is correct, this would be the first nonperturbative formulation of a quantum theory
which includes gravity’ (p. 2, my emphasis). And later they say:
‘Our conjecture is thus that M-theory formulated in the infinite momentum frame
is exactly equivalent to the N → ∞ limit of the supersymmetric quantum mechanics
described by the Hamiltonian (4.6). The calculation of any physical quantity in M-
theory can be reduced to a calculation in matrix quantum mechanics followed by an
extrapolation to large N .’ (p. 11, my emphasis).
(C) In an influential review on gauge-gravity duality (cf. Sect. 4.1.1), Aharony et
al. (1999: p. 57, my emphasis) formulate duality in terms of sameness of theoretical
description, or theory: ‘Thus, we are led to the conjecture that... Yang–Mills theory in
3 + 1 dimensions is the same as (or dual to)... superstring theory on AdS5 × S5’.19
19 The words omitted in the quotation are technical details specifying the two theories involved, viz. N = 4,
U(N ) super-Yang–Mills theory, and type IIB string theory.
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They extend this conjecture to a full equivalence between string theory and gauge
theory: ‘The strong form of the conjecture, which is the most interesting one and which
we will assume here, is that the two theories are exactly the same for all values of gs
and N [i.e. the string coupling constant and number of colours, respectively].’ (p. 60,
my emphasis).
The common thread is clear: these are all cases of conjectured, but exact, equiva-
lences of the theoretical structures (sometimes, in a limit of the physical parameters
that is relevant to the theories involved). This is in agreement with the Schema’s defi-
nition of duality, given in Sect. 2.2, and it grounds the theoretical function of duality:
namely, duality thus construed is a relationship between models that are already there
and which were previously thought to be unrelated.
In light of the discussion in Sect. 3.2 on the theoretical function of a tool, we
can now understand a conjectured duality as a help in finding more perspicacious
formulations of a given model. This is for example the case when physicists use the
better-known side of the duality to investigate the lesser-known side. This is akin to
solving a problem (even: formulating a model description of a system) in momentum
space, and then doing the Fourier transformation back to position space. This use of the
Fourier transform, which is a deductive rule that by itself does not add any new degrees
of freedom, is a translation of one model description to another, and so it belongs to the
theoretical function. Unless the model description A was already known, the Fourier
transform would be of no help in getting the model description B via duality. It is only
when the model description A is already worked out, that we can find out more about
the model description B, in a quasi-mechanical way, using the Fourier transform. The
same remarks go through for other dualities, in this kind of use.
But notice the assumption behind string theory dualities: within the theoretical
function, the duality relation itself will not change, once the two dual models are
formulated to our satisfaction (i.e. as a quadruple, involving the model root and the
specific structure: see Eq. 2.1). Rather, the search for a satisfactory formulation of two
dual models is a search for two structures that stand in precisely the relation that is
described by the duality conjecture. On this view, duality is not to be superseded in the
theory one is aiming to construct: rather, establishing duality is the aim of the proof
of the duality conjecture. The duality is to be instantiated by the final pair of models:
perhaps in a manifest and completely obvious way, on a sufficiently perspicacious
formulation of them. I will call the theory, T , thus obtained the common core theory:
for this theory contains the core stucture that the models deem physical (usually, a
triple of states, quantities, and dynamics, as in Sect. 2.1), and this core structure is
isomorphic between dual models, i.e. it is their common core: viz. the model root,
Eq. (2.1), of each of the models.
4.1.3 Duality and approximation: duality as a heuristic for theory construction
In this Section, I discuss within string theory the heuristic function of duality, in the
sense of Sect. 3.3, and give some quotations from the physics literature supporting
the existence, and even the essential role, of this function, in the recent programme of
string theory and M theory.
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The physics quotations below also emphasises the lack of exactness of the theories
involved (viz. they are perturbative) and the use of dualities as heuristics for finding
new unifying theories (or new formulations of old theories, describing more physics).
The heuristic function, in the context of this literature, is then seen to be strongly
linked with the aim of unification. The examples are as follows:
(A) In a review paper about dualities, Dijkgraaf (1997: p. 120, my emphasis) connects
the approximate nature of dualities to the suggestion of the existence of new theories:
‘The insight that all perturbative string theories are different expansions of one theory
is now known as string duality... It is one of the amazing new insights following from
string duality that these theories are all expansions of one and the same theory around
different points in the moduli space of vacua.’
‘Expansion... around a point’ should here be taken in the sense of, for example, a
Taylor series expansion of a function about a particular point: which is captured by
the notion of ‘approximation’, discussed in Sect. 3.3. Dijkgraaf also emphasises the
‘perturbative’ nature of the dual models, i.e. their lack of validity beyond a certain order
in such an expansion (a so-called ‘perturbative expansion’). Thus, Dijkgraaf’s picture
of dualities is one which regards models as inexact, and dualities as only approximately
instantiated, i.e. the dualities are valid only within a limited range of parameters, but
are to be superseded by a better theory, namely what he calls ‘one and the same theory’,
of which the mutually dual models are expansions, i.e. approximations.
(B) In the paper in which Witten put forward the influential M theory conjecture, he
wrote (1995: p. 2, my emphasis): ‘S-duality between weak and strong coupling for the
heterotic string in four dimensions... really ought to be a clue for a new formulation
of string theory.’
‘Another motivation was to try to relate four-dimensional S-duality to statements
or phemonena in more than four dimensions... we are bound to learn something if we
succeed’ (p. 2).
‘...in this paper, we will analyze the strong coupling limit of certain string theories
in certain dimensions. Many of the phenomena are indeed novel, and many of them
are indeed related to dualities’ (p. 2).
‘Combining these statements with the much shakier relations discussed in the
present paper, one would have a web of connections between the five string theo-
ries and eleven-dimensional supergravity’ (p. 4).
These quotes by Dijkgraaf and Witten underline a related aspect of dualities: they
use terms like ‘amazing’, ‘new insights’, ‘clue for a new formulation’, ‘learn some-
thing’, ‘novel phenomena’. The emphasis here, unlike the quotes from Sect. 4.1.2,
is not on the conjectured equivalence between already existing models: but on the
novelty of theory which can arise once a duality between such models is understood.
They also emphasise duality’s pointing to ‘a new formulation of string theory’:
where I take it that ‘a new formulation’ is more than just a ‘reformulation’: for a
new formulation contains something extra, not only in terms of the mathematical
formalism, but also in terms of the physics that is associated with that formalism—as
the other quotes confirm, when they talk about novelty of phenomena: ‘we are bound
to learn something’ and ‘[m]any of the phenomena are indeed novel’.
Thus, dualities here point to the existence of new theories, but are ultimately bound
to be superseded: the new theory, once found, will explain these dualities as being
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the result of certain approximations, which can be done in different ways, but lead
to identical results, as articulated in the duality. But once that new theory is reached,
the duality is no longer needed, except for practical purposes: for the resulting theory
is a single, complete theory. In other words, establishing duality is here not the goal:
rather, it is an intermediate step towards finding a new theory.
In what follows, I will dub that new theory, the one that supersedes the dual models
and of which they are particular limits, the successor theory, TS.20
These two viewpoints thus lead to different uses of duality in string theory. On
the view discussed in Sect. 4.1.2, the goal is to look for a theory, T , that realises the
dualities as manifestly as possible. On the view in this Section, the goal is to find
the successor theory, TS, that is “behind” the dualities, and which reveals them to be
approximations. As I will argue in more detail in the next Section, even if they lead
to two different research programmes, the two ideas need not contradict one another,
and one could pursue both. But it is important to clearly distinguish the two functions:
for otherwise, confusion easily ensues about the nature of duality, and about what one
is entitled to expect from a duality conjecture.
4.2 Does the distinction imply a tension?
In this Section, I argue that the distinction between the two functions does not neces-
sarily imply a tension.
At first sight, the previous quotes might suggest the distinction as a tension: in the
first case (Sect. 4.1.2), string theory and M theory instantiate the dualities exactly,
while in the second case (Sect. 4.1.3) dualities are perturbative clues towards finding
a new theory, which will not instantiate duality exactly. However, one should interpret
these quotations with some care, since they are not very precise (for example, the
articles do not even include definitions of what is meant by ‘duality’) and they involve
quantum field theories and string theories which are still being developed: therefore,
some of the central questions, viz. whether the models as formulated are exactly valid,
or whether dualities are exactly instantiated by the models, simply cannot be answered
at this stage.
Nevertheless, I argue that the tension does not simply come down to lack of knowl-
edge about the models involved: for the same tension exists for dualities and models
which are exact, and well-known.21
Here are two important reasons why the two accounts, duality as exact equivalence,
and duality as an approximately instantiated equivalence and pointing to new physics,
might be thought to be in tension. First, they do not refer to two different levels of
20 The fact that there is a theory, TS, which succeeds the dual models, does not imply any specific stance
about questions about scientific realism or referential stability across theory change. See footnote 17. For
a summary of the debate over referential stability, see Radder (2012: §3.6) and Psillos (1999).
21 This tension is analogous to that between emergence and duality (cf. De Haro 2015; Dieks et al. 2014).
In that case, there exist two mechanisms which can make duality and emergence compatible. First, there can
be emergence independently, on the two sides of the duality (rather than across the duality relation). Second,
there can be emergence if the duality is either not exact, or broken, for whatever reason. My resolution, in
Sect. 5, of the tension between the two functions of duality will be similar.
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explanation or of ontology. Namely, being ‘two dual models of a single theory’ or
being ‘approximate dual models of a new underlying theory’ both operate at the level
of the formal structure: therefore, this potential resolution (‘the two accounts operate
at different levels, and so they do not contradict one another’) is not available. Second,
they might be seen to be in tension because the former sense assumes an exact duality,
and being an exact instantiation of a theory; while the latter necessitates dualities
which are not exactly instantiated, thus pointing to a new (unifying) theory, of which
the two models are only approximations.
Nevertheless, I claim that, when made explicit in a language sufficiently precise
using the Schema from Sect. 2, the tension turns out to be only apparent, and can be
resolved. Namely, one distinguishes two different theories, corresponding to two dif-
ferent ways in which the theory to be constructed can relate to the given duality. Duality
is then recognised as having two different functions, which aim at the construction of
different kinds of theories, as I will analyse in Sect. 5.22
5 The heuristic function of duality and theoretical equivalence
In this Section, I come to the central question, of how the Schema of De Haro (2016,
2018b) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017), reviewed in Sect. 2, bears on the heuris-
tic function of duality and theoretical equivalence. I will illustrate, in some simple
but explicit examples, how dualities (and symmetries) can be used heuristically. In
Sect. 5.1, I will give examples of heuristic uses of approximate dualities, in the con-
struction of new theories. In Sect. 5.2, I will analyse the resulting successor theories
and models in more detail.
5.1 How to use dualities heuristically
In this Section, I will give examples of the use of dualities according to the heuristic
function, i.e. for constructing new theories. In Sect. 5.1.1, I will give an example of a
point particle, and in Sect. 5.1.2 I will make some analogies with similar problems in
quantum gravity.
5.1.1 Point particle heuristics
In this Section, I use the example of a point-like particle to illustrate the heuristic
function. Our question is whether the successor theory, TS, which one constructs from
a duality between models could be ‘bigger’ than its models: what we would like the
22 Coffey has noted an analogous tension in the context of theoretical equivalence between classical physical
theories: a ‘tension between the symmetrical nature of theoretical equivalence and the asymmetrical nature of
some reformulation judgments’ (Coffey 2016: footnote 19). Though my tension differs from his (his focuses
on asymmetry, and especially asymmetry of ontology; while mine focuses on theory construction), his
questions are similar to mine: ‘One, how can a symmetric relation of theoretical equivalence accommodate
an asymmetry of reformulation? Two, why does this asymmetry only occur in some cases and not others?’
(p. 832). But our resolutions are very different: Coffey opts for an interpretative solution; but as I expounded
in De Haro (2018a), I think this is a mistake, since the tension is there even for uninterpreted theories.
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outcome of such a construction to be is a more general and precise theory, which
comprises the models as special cases, or as approximations to, specific physical
situations—so, they are approximate representations of the theory.
It is not hard to suggest how this may happen, and I will illustrate this in one of the
examples from De Haro (2018a).
The example concerns a classical point particle moving on the real line. Its config-
uration space is C = R, and its space of states S is the cotangent bundle comprising
the (canonical) position and momenta, i.e. S = T ∗C.
A model of this particle is given by a choice of polarisation of the cotangent bundle,
i.e. a local decomposition between (canonical) position and momentum variables,
X = (q, p) ∈ T ∗R. Such a model is, as in Eq. (2.1), a quadruple:
MX := 〈T ∗RX , ωX ; HX ; EX ; X〉 . (5.1)
The specific structure is here the local decomposition, X , between position and momen-
tum variables. The state space is S = T ∗RX , equipped with a symplectic form. The
set of quantities, Q, contains a single element, namely the Hamiltonian, HX (for sim-
plicity of the model, I have taken this to be the only quantity: but it is of course no
problem to include any powers of x and p also as quantities in Q). EX is the dynamics,
presented as the Hamiltonian equation of motion.
But any other choice of such a decomposition, X¯ = (q¯, p¯), preserving the Poisson
bracket {Xα, Xβ} = ωαβ (where α, β = 1, 2 and X1 = x , X2 = p), will of course give
an equivalent model. In other words, a change of polarisation, given as a linear map
S : X 	→ X¯ = S · X , gives an equivalent model iff it preserves the symplectic (closed
and degenerate) two-form ω := dq ∧ dp. The set of transformations S satisfying
these conditions turn out to act on T ∗R as SL(2,R) ∼= Sp(2,R), viz. the group of
area-preserving linear transformations on the phase space. The models are therefore
best presented, alternatively: as given by the action of an element S ∈ Sp(2,R) on
some fidutial, i.e. initially chosen, polarisation; as follows:
MS := 〈T ∗RX¯ , ωX¯ ; HX¯ ; EX¯ ; S, X〉S∈S p(2,R) , (5.2)
where we now have one model for each S ∈ SL(2,R) ∼= Sp(2,R). Here, X¯ = S · X ,
as above, and the subscript X¯ indicates that the corresponding item is evaluated using
X¯ := S ·X . The specific structure, M¯ = {S, X}, is given by the particular S ∈ Sp(2,R)
matrix chosen for the model, together with the choice of reference state X , out of which
the set of models is generated.
In De Haro (2018a) it was argued that one can reconstruct a common core theory
from a set of models Eq. (5.2). The theory is obtained by taking the union of all these
models, and modding out by an equivalence relation which identifies two models if
they belong to the same Sp(2,R) orbit, i.e. if there is an S ∈ Sp(2,R) which relates
the variables X¯ between the two models. The result is of course a set of states which
is the symplectic manifold S = (T ∗R, ω), together with a single scalar quantity,
and the Hamilton equations, written in terms of ω (see e.g. Abraham and Marsden
1978: Chapter 3), Butterfield (2006: §4.3).
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In geometric quantisation, the Sp(2,R) invariance of the classical theory carries
over to the quantum theory, where the Poisson bracket is replaced by a commutator,
[Xα, Xβ ] = i h¯ ωαβ . A state is now specified by an element of the Hilbert space of
square-integrable wave-functions on the joint spectrum of a maximal set of commuting
operators. Picking a basis for this Hilbert space is choosing a polarisation of the wave-
function, which is allowed to depend on both x and p, ψ(x, p), but is subject to
an additional constraint. For example, demanding ∂ψ(x,p)
∂p = 0, we get the position
representation of the wave-function.
This choice is of course a stipulation, and it is not unique: any other choice of
polarisation can be made by picking an element S ∈ SL(2,R), and so X¯ := S · X ,
such that X and X¯ are linearly independent, and demanding the independence of the
wave-function upon this particular element:
∂ψ
(
X, X¯
)
∂ X¯
= 0 . (5.3)
This requirement thus builds the Sp(2,R) duality (which includes the x ↔ p duality)
into the common core theory.
The above use of Sp(2,R) duality suggests how to get a successor theory describing
more degrees of freedom, of which the above models, MS , are only approximately
models, i.e. representations. Each of the models should somehow have an embedding
in the successor theory (and perhaps even an extension into that theory), so that duality
does not hold exactly in the entire new theory, and it does not hold exactly between
the extensions of the models, if such extensions are given. The idea is indeed to break
the duality.
We can obtain such a theory by a slight modification of the quantum mechanical
point-particle example. The physics we will be entertaining here is slightly speculative:
but notice that this is exactly what the heuristic function of dualities is supposed to
do!—it is supposed to help us construct new theories. So, by suggesting, in this Section,
how the simple point-particle example can lead to new theories, I hope to illustrate the
heuristic function of dualities in the string theory and M theory programme: which is,
of course, immensely more complex.
The idea is to study a specific quantum version of the classical particle: not just a
straightforward quantisation of a point particle, but a quantum theory which includes
additional dynamics.
The heuristic approach to this duality suggests a generalisation of this independence
of the wave-function from half of the variables. After all, that constraint arises from
the kinematically given algebra between position and momenta. But the dynamics
might dictate a more general algebra, of which the simple Heisenberg algebra is a
special case. In other words, the heuristic approach here seeks to make the choice
of polarisation arise dynamically from the theory, and perhaps receive corrections
away from some ‘perturbative’ limit. So, the right-hand side of the Eq. (5.3) only
goes to zero in a special limit. The Hilbert space then has two sectors (position and
momentum), one of which is dropped by the choice of polarisation (which now arises
as an equation of motion, in a special limit). But in the full theory, without taking any
limits, the entire Hilbert space is required. The SL(2,R) symmetry is thus a special
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simplifying property of the limit. More precisely: we are led towards a theory with a
Hilbert space that is constructed from L2(T ∗R) rather than L2(R). The latter will arise
as a limit of the theory, in which one of the equations imposes a choice of polarisation.
In the next subsection I give some examples, from the quantum gravity literature,
where such things happen.
5.1.2 Quantum gravity heuristics
In this Section, I discuss analogues, from the quantum gravity literature, of the idea
discussed in the previous Section, namely of doing a geometric quantisation of a point
particle which is subject to a duality constraint like Eq. (5.3), and then generalising
this by including dynamical corrections that break that duality.
A first example closely following the previous discussion are quantum theories for
the point particle which incorporate quantum gravity effects. Here, the mechanism
for breaking the SL(2,R) duality is different. The classical theory is quantised by
demanding [Xα, Xβ ] = i h¯ ωαβ like before, but quantum gravity effects, such as
gravitational particle collisions, correct this relation, adding X -dependent terms on the
right-hand side.23 In this case, too, the SL(2,R) duality is explained as an approximate
duality of the successor theory, which becomes exact in the limit in which quantum
gravity effects are negligible; but away from that limit, the theory looks quite different,
and the wave-function does not satisfy the simple constraint Eq. (5.3). The upshot is
that duality can here be understood as the result of a ‘turning off’ of quantum gravity
effects.
S duality The example of a point particle, and of duality as an SL(2,R) symmetry,
is also reminiscent of S duality in quantum field theory, which is a generalisation of
electric-magnetic duality, in four-dimensional (supersymmetric) Yang–Mills theory. In
that case, the duality group is SL(2,Z), and it acts as integral-fractional transformations
on the theory’s complexified coupling, which takes values on a two-torus, T2. Notice
that, despite the fact that this might look similar to a gauge symmetry, it is not a gauge
symmetry at all, because it is not the gauge fields, but the coupling constant which is
being transformed.
The duality group SL(2,Z) can be given a geometric meaning, by embedding the
theory in six dimensions, i.e. considering the manifold which is the product of the two-
torus (the space on which the coupling takes values) with ordinary four-dimensional
Minkowski space, i.e. T2 × R4. The coupling constant can then be identified with the
complex structure of the two-torus T2, and the duality group SL(2,Z) becomes the
mapping class group of, what is now, a real torus.
The low-energy dynamics of this six-dimensional gauge theory reproduces that of
the four-dimensional super-Yang–Mills theory, with its duality symmetry SL(2,Z).
But now once the six-dimensional interpretation is reached, one can imagine more gen-
eral situations (of high energies, and-or containing other kinds of interactions) in which
the four-dimensional perspective is only an approximation to the six-dimensional
23 For a seminal discussion of such commutators, see Snyder (1947: Eq. 8). For more recent accounts in
the context of quantum gravity, see Kempf (1994: §2.1), De Haro (1998: Eq. 69). For generalised versions
of the uncertainty principle, see Maggiore (1993: Eq. 7).
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dynamics, so that also the four-dimensional duality group SL(2,Z) is only an approx-
imate symmetry.
Thus, here again, making the duality group arise as an approximation of a
physical system, suggests generalisations to a successor theory—in this case, a
higher-dimensional theory—which contains more possibilities than the ones strictly
postulated by duality.
5.2 Successor theories and models
In this Section, I gather the ideas from the examples in Sect. 5.1, and give a more
concrete account of the successor theory, TS, according to the schema for duality
introduced in Sect. 2. I first discuss the point particle (Sect. 5.2.1) and then discuss
successor theories more generally (Sect. 5.2.2).
5.2.1 Theories and models: the point particle
We briefly go back, in this Section, to the point particle example from Sect. 5.1.1,
and its quantum gravity analogue from Sect. 5.1.2, to discuss the resulting successor
theory. The idea was to consider initially a theory with a simple duality, namely the
group SL(2,R) or SL(2,Z), expressing a redundancy of the theoretical description,
so that some putative degrees of freedom are unphysical and so are constrained by the
duality. On this common core theory, duality is realised as a symmetry, and the dif-
ference between taking a wave-function that depends on a coordinate X , and taking a
wave-function that depends on a different coordinate X¯ := S · X , where S ∈ SL(2,R)
(or SL(2,Z)) is a symmetry transformation, was a mere ‘choice of polarisation’, by
the theory’s own lights. However, further physics could lead one to a different situ-
ation, described by the successor theory, in which the duality symmetry is broken.
Thus, physical effects came to distinguish two choices, X and X¯ , as physically dis-
tinct situations after all: so that the theory therefore changes, because the symmetry
constraint, Eq. (5.3), is no longer satisfied—it is replaced by a more general formula
in which the symmetry is allowed to be broken. For example, in the case of S duality,
the SL(2,Z) transformations are the symmetries of a two-torus (they correspond to
distinct complex structures of the torus), and they correspond to geometrically distinct
six-dimensional manifolds (cf. Sect. 5.1.2). Manifolds with distinct complex structure
are indistinguishable at low-energies, but at high energies the different tori can be
distinguished.
Because the initial models were consistent, there are well-defined physical condi-
tions under which SL(2,R) is indeed a duality group of the common core theory—thus
realising duality just as symmetry, which entitled one to interpret the models as rep-
resenting physically identical situations (under certain assumptions which we do not
need to consider here).24 But without these physical conditions, i.e. if the SL(2,R)
24 For a discussion of symmetries, cf. Greaves and Wallace (2013), Teh (2016) and De Haro et al. (2015).
It is fair to say that there is no general formal criterion known that could a priori tell us whether a symmetry
contains physical content. (For a review of several failed attempts at finding a formal notion of equivalence
that relates physically identical states of affairs, see Belot 2013). For a view on symmetries where the formal
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symmetry is broken by dynamical effects as just discussed for the torus, then an
SL(2,R) transformation relates physically distinct situations. The theory which dis-
tinguishes the SL(2,R)-distinct situations is the successor theory, TS (i.e. the theory
which includes the corrections on the right-hand side of Eq. (5.3)). When duality is
realised in this theory as an approximate symmetry, the symmetry transformation can
be interpreted physically: not as a redundancy,25 but as making an actual physical
distinction! And so, we have here a miniature version of the kind of role duality is
supposed to play in the string and M theory programme.
Notice that the successor theory, TS, also gives an explanation for the duality:
namely, in the duality, what are in fact different models, or different limits of TS, look
like isomorphic models Mi , because of the approximations (to TS) they introduce.
The model notation Mi = 〈mi , M¯i 〉 (for i ∈ I in an appropriate index set I ) from
Eq. (2.1) should make this clear. For example, in the point particle case, equivalent
models were obtained by SL(2,R) transformations, and so the set indexing the dif-
ferent models is I = SL(2,R). The specific structure was given in that case by, first,
the specific SL(2,R) transformation used and, second, the representative, X , of the
orbit, so that: M¯ = {S, X}, and S ∈ SL(2,R). In this case, all the models are isomor-
phic to each other, i.e. mi ∼= m j (i, j ∈ I ). But this is in general of course not so,
because a theory can have both equivalent and inequivalent models. The set of models
{Mi }i∈I (isomorphic and non-isomorphic ones) is then the set of representations of
the underlying theory, T .
The heuristic construction of the successor theory, TS, is then envisaged to proceed
in two steps, as follows:26
Initially, i.e. for exact dualities, and assuming for simplicity only equivalent models,
only the model triples mi (i ∈ I ), i.e. the models stripped of their specific structure,
are interpreted as being physical. More precisely: the specific structure, M¯i , gives each
model its specificity: it is like the choice of SL(2,R)-representative S, and it is not
physical. Because Eq. (5.3) holds, such a choice does not correspond to actual physics,
but is made by stipulation.
But subsequently, some new physics modifies the relation like Eq. (5.3) (i.e. the
relation which allowed us to stipulate a choice of specific structure), so that (typically!)
more variables are needed to describe the problem: which prompts us to interpret part
of the specific structure as actually being physical, in the modified model. In the
example of S duality, the set I = SL(2,Z) now receives a physical interpretation as
the mapping class group of a torus,27 T2, which is part of a physical, six-dimensional
Footnote 24 continued
and the interpretative aspects are in balance, see Caulton 2015). Judgment about this surely requires looking
at the specific details of the theory in question, and at various messy physical details of the system to which
the theory is applied.
25 Recall, from footnote 24, that not all symmetries express redundancies. But, for simplicity of exposition, I
assumed that the symmetries considered in Sect. 5.1.1 express sameness of description, i.e. the corresponding
interpretations are internal, in the sense of De Haro (2016).
26 There is no claim here that the two-step procedure outlined below is somehow unique or necessary. One
can think of slightly different procedures that amount to the same thing: namely, a successor theory TS
which is approximated by both T and by T ’s models.
27 The mapping class group of a topological space is the discrete group of symmetries of that space.
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geometry. This choice is now physical, because the choice of complex structure of T2
is physical—it is part of the geometry on which the theory is defined. And so, a choice
of specific structure—a choice of S—is no longer innocuous; and Eq. (5.3) receives
corrections, which correspond to different such choices. The successor theory, TS,
describing these corrections differs from T , because it incorporates the symmetry as
a physical symmetry of its triple, at least in a suitable approximation (such as: the
area of the internal torus going to zero), which now incorporates some of what used
to be the specific structure. In effect, we have changed the models and the theories:
some of the specific structure has now become part of the triple, giving rise to new
states (new physical situations), new quantities (which make a distinction between
those situations) and new dynamics (accounting for new interactions).
5.2.2 Successor theories and the heuristic function
The heuristic function of dualities is the ability to use dualities in the constructive way
just discussed, i.e. for building new theories: starting with exact dualities, viz. equiv-
alent models, building successor theories that implement the duality as approximate
symmetries (or as other constitutive parts of the theory’s structure leading to approx-
imately isomorphic models), and then reinterpreting the symmetries, or parts of
structure, as special properties of a limit or approximation to a specific physical sys-
tem. Away from the limit, the number of degrees of freedom of the theory (i.e. number
of the states and-or quantities) is typically not reduced, but increases: at any rate, the
physical interpretation changes.
Thus there is no longer a duality, but only a theory with one or several approxima-
tions or limits: duality holds only approximately, but there is a self-consistent regime
in which duality obtains. The use of TS, from the point of view of duality, is that it
explains the physical origin of the duality, and exhibits how duality is implemented.
So, duality ends up being a property of idealised models, but not a property of the
physical successor theory. This is what Radder (1991) has called heuristics ‘from the
old theory to the new theory’, i.e. the heuristic function helps one find a successor,
more accurate, theory given a set of models.
The conceptual picture arising should now be clear, in the Schema from Sect. 2.
We have an initial theory, T , and its set of isomorphic models, Mi (i ∈ I ). The theory
and its models need not be well-defined for arbitrary values of the parameters; they
may have limited validity, and also the dualities may hold only approximately (in
an idealisation within the successor theory, in which certain interactions, or certain
complicating factors such as finite area, are neglected). The successor theory, TS, is
then able to reproduce T and its models (or something very close to them) as special
cases, for particular approximations. TS does not exhibit exact duality, and the models
are not exact representations of TS. Also, TS usually reinterprets the specific structure
M¯i of the models physically: TS then changes the definition of the models.
We see that there are two ways to make the theoretical and the heuristic functions
compatible, i.e. we can:28
28 This is analogous to the resolution of the tension between duality and emergence, in De Haro (2015)
and Dieks et al. (2014).
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(i) Extend the models beyond their original domain of application, even if they are
no longer exactly dual, and find a successor theory, TS, of which those models,
perhaps modified, are now exact (but not necessarily dual) representations; or
(ii) We can simply find a new theory, TS, of which the original models are approximate
representations.
Intermediate positions are of course also possible.
The analogy with the analogous problem of symmetries, mentioned in footnote 24,
is that the physical contents of T and TS are different. In T , one was entitled (though
not invariably obliged) to interpret dualities as mere redundancies. This is no longer
possible in TS, because the duality is now seen to be a consequence of an approximation
to a certain physical situation: in other words, the physical contents of T and TS are
different, and part of the physical content of TS now implies the approximate duality.
6 Comparing the schema with other philosophical work on duality
In this Section, I will compare the Schema’s analysis of the heuristics of duality, to
other accounts in the recent philosophical (and physical) literature. In Sect. 6.1, I
compare the present analysis to another interesting account of duality, namely the
‘duality-as-gauge-symmetry’ account. In Sect. 6.2, I compare my construal of the
successor theory, TS, with what Rickles has called the ‘deeper theoretical structure’
that is behind a duality.
6.1 Isomorphism versus gauge symmetry and heuristics
In this Subsection, I let the analysis of the heuristic function from Sects. 4 and 5, which
was an application of the Schema from Sect. 2, bear on the comparison between
the isomorphism versus the gauge symmetry accounts of duality, for the heuristic
function.29
If the Schema’s account of duality can be stated (in a slogan) as ‘duality is an
isomorphism of model roots’, then the gauge symmetry account can be stated (in a
slogan) as ‘duality is a gauge symmetry of a deeper theory’.
According to the gauge symmetry account, a duality points toward the existence
of a theory which realizes the duality as a gauge symmetry. Now ‘gauge symmetry’
is a vague word about which there is still much confusion. It is therefore necessary to
make the following distinction (quoting from De Haro et al. 2015: Sect. 2, i–ii):30
‘(i) (Redundant): If a physical theory’s formulation is redundant (i.e. roughly: it uses
more variables than the number of degrees of freedom of the system being described),
one can often think of this in terms of an equivalence relation, ‘physical equivalence’,
on its states; so that gauge-invariant quantities are constant on an equivalence class
and gauge-symmetries are maps leaving each class (called a ‘gauge-orbit’) invariant.
29 The gauge symmetry account of duality is also discussed in De Haro (2018b), for the theoretical function.
30
‘Gauge symmetry’ does not at all exhaust the meaning of ‘symmetry’. My argument is that, although in
most cases duality can be seen as a symmetry of T , it is in general not a gauge symmetry.
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Leibniz’s criticism of Newtonian mechanics provides a putative example: he believed
that shifting the entire material contents of the universe by one meter must be regarded
as changing only its description, and not its physical state.
(ii) (Local): If a physical theory has a symmetry (i.e. roughly, a transformation of
its variables that preserves its Lagrangian) that transforms some variables in a way
dependent on spacetime position (and is thus ‘local’) then this symmetry is called
‘gauge’. In the context of Yang–Mills theory, these variables are ‘internal’, whereas
in the context of General Relativity, they are spacetime variables.’
The trouble with the (i) (Redundant) account of duality [i.e. the idea that duality
is a gauge symmetry, where gauge symmetry is construed as (i) (Redundant)], is
that it wrongly assumes dual theories to be invariably physically equivalent. I have
argued this point in detail in De Haro (2016: §1.3, §2.2) and I will not dwell on it here.
Namely, concluding that two dual theories are invariably physically equivalent without
further technical and philosophical analysis, is simply incorrect: as one can show with
obvious counter-examples (and this is true whether one construes the phrase ‘physical
equivalence’ in terms of reference, as I do, or in terms of the descriptive capacities of
a theory).31
The construal of gauge symmetry I am therefore interested in here is (ii) (Local).
First: because this is an interesting proposal in its own right, and some examples
in string theory would seem to point in that direction.32 Second, it is an interesting
alternative to the Schema, especially because it is technically much more specific than
(Redundant): its level of specificity roughly matching the most detailed version of the
Schema in Sect. 2, i.e. duality as an isomorphism of triples of states, quantities, and
dynamics, which are representations of the same theory, in the representation-theoretic
sense of the word.
The example of the point particle in Sect. 5.1.1 might give the false impression that
the gauge symmetry account, (ii) (Local), is indeed confirmed, because duality ends
up being an SL(2,R) or SL(2,Z) symmetry of the theory. But, as already remarked
31 The gauge symmetry account, especially in its (i) (Redundant) variant, is defended by Rickles (2017):
‘this can be generalized to all cases in which one has a duality symmetry: they can always be promoted to
gauge-type symmetries because they just are gauge-type symmetries’ (p. 66). In terms of the distinction just
given, (i) versus (ii), Rickles’ account is, however, ambiguous. Overall, he seems to endorse the more general
notion of gauge symmetry, viz. (i) (Redundant). For example, he mentions that a ‘natural interpretation [of
duality] should be taken as a mere representation of a deeper underlying structure’ (p. 63), and so the
emphasis present in ‘mere representation’ suggests he means (Redundant). Also, he clearly characterises
his proposal as follows: ‘the differences [should] be viewed as unphysical in exactly the sense of gauge
freedom: the duality mapping leaves invariant all of the physically meaningful quantities and symmetries’
(p. 65). However, elsewhere he mentions, as an example of a gauge symmetry, the ability to choose a specific
labelling of points in general relativity (p. 64): which would rather make it a case of (Local). Also, when
he quotes Fuchs and Schweigert on p. 66, he characteries their quotation as being about ‘gauge symmetry’,
whereas the original passage quoted refers to a more general kind of symmetry, not a gauge symmetry.
Overall, however, Rickles seems to have (i) (Redundant) in mind.
32 The case of T duality can, on a sufficiently technical and perspicacious formulation, indeed be regarded
as (part of) a gauge symmetry. More precisely, the discrete Z2 duality group that is T duality, can be shown
to be a subgroup of an SU(2) × SU(2) gauge symmetry formed by the operators describing the bosonic
background of the theory (cf. Polchinski 1998: pp. 242–248). The question thus naturally arises whether
this generalises to all dualities (to which my answer, from the SL(2,R) and SL(2,Z) examples, and further
analysis below, is: No).
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in Sect. 5.1.2 for the case of S duality: these are not gauge symmetries [in the sense
of (Local)] at all! On the other hand, these both examples are cases of isomorphism
between models, i.e. they confirm the Schema in Sect. 2.
In fact, there is a stronger conclusion that follows from this. The summary (i)-(ii), in
the previous Section, of the two ways of realising the heuristic function, does not make
any reference to a theory T instantiating the duality as a symmetry (whether gauge or
otherwise). Indeed, although an instantiation of duality as a symmetry of T may exist
some cases, it is not the general case: namely, if T exists, it need not realise duality as
symmetry. But neither is duality realised as a symmetry of the successor theory, TS: in
fact, we know that duality cannot be a symmetry of TS! For if it were, the duality would
be exactly instantiated by TS—which by definition it is not, either on the first account (i),
or on the second, (ii), from the previous Section. In other words, there is no requirement
that T or TS must realise duality as symmetry (gauge or otherwise): and, in fact, it is also
true that duality is not in general realised as a symmetry of TS, but only (if at all) as a
symmetry of T (though not a gauge symmetry). Thus the ‘duality as gauge symmetry’
account, though at first sight appealing, is unable to deal with these examples.
6.2 Rickles’ comments on the ‘deeper theory’
I mentioned, in footnote 1 of the Introduction, that Rickles (together with Dieks et al.
2014; De Haro and Butterfield 2017) is the exception, in the recent literature on
dualities, to the statement that the heuristic use of duality has gone unnoticed. In this
Section, I compare the Schema’s analysis of the heuristic function to a few of Rickles’
comments.33 Rickles’ ideas here, as on many other issues, are deep. But I will also
find them to be problematic.
I will comment, below, on a number of passages by Rickles (all emphases are mine),
which revolve around two main points, both of which are supposed to highlight the
heuristic function of duality:
(i) Dualities point towards a ‘deeper theoretical structure’ that explains why there is
a duality.
(ii) A good analogy for this deeper theoretical structure is given by the electromag-
netic field, which unifies the electric and magnetic fields.
I will of course agree with Rickles on his first point, (i): since this is what I have advo-
cated in detail in this paper, and indeed also briefly in previous papers (see e.g. Figures
2–4 in Dieks et al. 2014). Thus roughly, Rickles’ phrase ‘deeper theoretical structure’
could tentatively be taken to correspond to my successor theory, TS, which it is the
task of the heuristic function to discover (as opposed to the theoretical function, which
discovers the theory T ).
But I will argue that (ii) is mistaken: for the electromagnetic field is not an example
of the use of the heuristic function at all. Rather, it is an example of the theoretical
function (the analogy between gauge-gravity duality and electric-magnetic duality is
discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of Dieks et al. (2014), as part of the theoretical
33 I thank one reviewer for providing me with the set of quotes below.
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function). Thus I will argue that Rickles’ ‘deeper theoretical structure’ sometimes
refers to TS, and sometimes to T : and so, his phrase ‘deeper theoretical structure’ does
not really express the heuristic function of duality.
My first four quotes from Rickles below will add up to point (i), i.e. that there is a
deeper theoretical structure that explains why there is a duality:
(1) ‘The mere existence of a duality points to unphysical structure in the dual
theories. Thus, any interpretation we give is ‘provisional’, and points towards some
common core. This common core might be fully understood (as a deeper theoretical
structure encompassing both dual theories) or might be known only via the limited
information provided by the dual pair.’ (Rickles 2017: p. 66).
(2) ‘Ultimately, of course, duality is not such a good case study for those who
wish to deny fundamentalism, since it points to deeper structures that may or may not
themselves have fundamental status’ (Rickles 2011: p. 66).
(3) ‘The fact that the dualities have been used to discover genuinely new and
unexpected physics are enough to pose a problem for anti-realists who will need to
provide an explanation for how this is possible.’ (Rickles 2011: p. 66).
(4) ‘[T]here is deep structure (given by the shared symmetries) that the two theories
have in common. This characterises a deeper structure, not yet fully understood, that
will admit at least two representations.’ (Rickles 2013: p. 319).
The next two quotes, below, make the point, (ii), that, in the example of electric-
magnetic duality, the electromagnetic field (which is the deeper theoretical structure
in that case) integrates both the electric and the magnetic field, so that they are two
aspects of one structure:
(5) ‘In this case the duality points to a deeper structure into which both the electric
and magnetic fields are integrated, namely the electromagnetic field. Hence, the dis-
covery of a duality between a pair of things can be ‘symptom’ that the pair of things
are really two aspects of one and the same underlying structure’ (Rickles 2011: p. 57).
(6) ‘[S]uch identification of core structure provides a methodology for scientific
discovery: identify common structures between theories or structures and then try to
understand this common structure via another deeper, broader theory that admits of
multiple representation. This is just what we find in the case of the duality between
electricity and magnetism which leads us to the deeper electromagnetic field. (Rickles
2013: p. 320).
As I said above: quotes (1) to (4) are, at least in letter, along the lines of what I have
said in this (and earlier) papers; and so I agree with Rickles. But my criticism is as
follows:
(I) No philosophical analysis of the heuristic function That dualities point to deeper
theoretical structure is of course known. For it was indeed the main claim of
Witten’s breakthrough lecture and paper in 1995 (see the quotes in Sect. 4.1.3),
namely the launching of the M theory programme.34
34 Rickles does of course contextualise the physicists’ claim within his other philosophical remarks. Also,
Rickles’ work on dualities has other virtues: especially, his connecting duality to some of the philosophical
discussions on theoretical equivalence. Finally, one must credit Rickles for pointing out, in quotation (6),
that there is a question of methodology in connexion with dualities.
123
Synthese
(II) Confusion between the theoretical and the heuristic function Although Rickles
repeatedly uses a phrase like ‘deeper theoretical structure’ or ‘deeper structure’,
he does not say exactly what he means by it: and, in fact, in the few instances in
which he does say it more explicitly, he gets it backwards. Namely, he refers to the
theoretical rather than to the heuristic function. This is seen from the following
four points, of which (A) and (D) are the central ones:
(A) In quote (4), he uses the word ‘representation’. But the definition of the succes-
sor theory, in Sect. 4.1.3, means that the dual models are not representations of
the successor theory TS! They are representations of T (if this theory exists),
and only approximate representations of TS. Thus it seems that Rickles has
here something like the theoretical function of duality in mind, rather than the
heuristic function.35
(B) Also, in the quoted passages, Rickles never uses words like ‘approximation’,
‘inexact or inaccurate theory’, ‘perturbative expansion’, etc.: which are key
words to describe what the heuristic function is about (see the quotes by the
physicists in Sect. 4.1.3). Had Rickles used them, he would have made it clear
that he was talking about the heuristic function.
(C) Rickles’ phrase ‘deeper structure’ is of course in itself ambiguous, because
it could refer either to T (where ‘deeper’ is used as in ‘mathematically more
perspicuous’, ‘more sophisticated’, or ‘more amenable to generalisation’), or
it can also refer to TS (where ‘deeper’ is used as in ‘valid in a physically larger
domain’, or ‘valid at higher energies’), i.e. it can refer either to the theoretical
or to the heuristic function, at least without further elaboration.
(D) His example of electromagnetism is incorrect, because the electromagnetic
field describes exactly the same physics as do the electric and magnetic fields.36
Compared to the electric and magnetic fields, the electromagnetic field is not
a case of a ‘deeper’ theory, in the sense of an approximation like TS. Rather, it
is deeper in the sense of the theoretical function leading to T , i.e. in the sense
of giving a more perspicacious formulation (because mathematically more
sophisticated, more unified, because the symmetries are explicitly exhibited,
etc.) of the same physics.
Thus, (A) to (D) amount to lacking a clear idea about the distinction between the
theoretical and the heuristic function.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I began by making a distinction between a theoretical and a heuristic
function of duality and of theoretical equivalence. Then, using the Schema from De
Haro (2016, 2018b) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017), I described these functions in
35 This argument is independent of whether or not one endorses the Schema from Sect. 2. For the statement
that the dual models cannot be representations of TS just follows from the notion of the successor theory.
36 This is of course no longer true in quantum field theory, where the gauge field formulation is more
fundamental, like for non-abelian theories. But this is not the issue here, since Rickles is talking about
classical theories.
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detail, as follows. The aim of the theoretical function is to discover, or to (re-)construct,
theoretically equivalent or dual models (theories). Thus the result achieved using that
function is a set of models, of which a number are theoretically equivalent (dual),
together with the common core theory—a theory of which those models are exact
representations. The theoretical function can be stated in precise mathematical terms,
and in some cases there are even reconstruction theorems that allow one to reconstruct
a theory from its set of models. The question here is not primarily about new physics:
for a theory thus constructed describes, at least in principle, the same systems as do the
models from which it was obtained. Nevertheless, a common core theory is formally
more perspicuous, and can also have other advantages over the models from which it
was constructed: for example, it admits new interpretations, or it admits new models.
The heuristic function aims to discover a successor theory, in the innocuous sense
of ‘a theory whose content goes beyond the content of the original models, and of
which the dual models are only approximate instantiations’. The relation between
this successor theory and its dual models, and the status of duality (or theoretical
equivalence), within the successor theory, cannot in general be established beforehand.
For it depends on the details of the successor theory which one ends up finding,
and on how much it differs from the original dual models. The successor theory is,
however, constrained by the requirement that the originally given dual models must
be approximate representations of it, so that the duality is recovered as a special case
of, or as an approximation to, the successor theory—and often, it is constrained by
additional requirements. Dualities of course often come with indications of the range
of parameters for which the successor theory should differ significantly from the given
dual models (e.g. ‘at strong coupling’, for a specific coupling in the theory), and the
regime in which it should reproduce the dual models (e.g. ‘at weak coupling’) or
something close to them.
Dual models often come with specific structure. The theoretical function aims at
excising this specific structure, i.e. finding a theory T that contains only the common
core of the dual models. On the other hand, the explicit examples we have reviewed
in Sect. 5 suggest that the heuristic function makes use of the specific structure, and
reinterprets it as physical structure in the successor theory, TS. Therefore, the two
functions interpret the models differently.
Thus the set of models, {Mi }i∈I , and the successor theory, TS, are related by a set
of dualities and approximation schemes. Duality and approximation usually relate
both the models’ and the theory’s formalisms (including: the number and nature of
the physical degrees of freedom, the dynamics, and the rules for calculating physical
quantities) and their interpretation (the model’s or theory’s reference to worldly items).
And so, these are relations between interpreted theories.
The schema for duality from De Haro (2016) and De Haro and Butterfield (2017)
also illustrates how the two functions of duality can be compatible. We distinguish
two theories, T from TS, which stand in different relationships to both duality and
to the models. The theoretical function aims to construct a theory, T , of which the
dual models are exact representations. The heuristic function aims to construct the
successor theory, TS: where the models are not instantiations, or representations, of
the latter theory, but rather approximations to it. In particular, if both the reconstructed
theory T and the successor theory TS exist, then one expects that T can be obtained
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from TS by making the appropriate approximations. Thus, T instantiates duality, while
TS does not instantiate duality: only approximately, through the approximation of its
models.
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